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England: England: Withdrawal of Nutrition and Hydration

WITHDRAWAL OF NUTRITION
AND HYDRATION FROM
INCOMPETENT PATIENTS IN
MISSOURI
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon1

I.

INTRODUCTION

May a guardian order that a hospital withhold all nutrition and hydration from an incompetent ward who is in a persistent vegetative state
but not terminally ill? That is the question presented in Cruzan ex rel.

Cruzan v. Harmon.2 In this case of first impression, the Missouri Supreme
Court answered no.3
In surveying earlier decisions dealing with similar issues, the Missouri
Supreme Court identified fifty-three decisions by courts in sixteen states.
Of those decisions, the Cruzan court wrote, "Nearly unanimously, those
courts have found a way to allow persons wishing to die, or those who
seek the death of a ward, to meet the end sought. ' 4 In response to the
growing number of court decisions permitting life-sustaining aid to be
withheld, the Cruzan court declared, "We have found them wanting and
refuse to eat 'on the insane root which takes the reason prisoner."' 5
In January, 1983 Nancy Cruzan overturned the automobile she was
driving. She was found thirty-five feet away, lifeless and not breathing. 6
Rescuers restored her breathing and circulation, but not before she had
been deprived of oxygen for an estimated twelve to fourteen minutes.7 She
was in a coma for three weeks before showing any improvement.8 Her
husband consented to the surgical implantation of a gastrostomy tube to

1. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en

banc), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
of Health, 57
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.

U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. July 3, 1989) (No. 88-1503).
at 412.
at 410.
at 412-13.
5. Id. at 412 n.5 (quoting SArXSPEARE, MAcBETH, I, iii.).
6. Id. at 430 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court).
7. Id. at 411.
8. Id.
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facilitate her feeding and to aid her recovery.9 Despite rehabilitative efforts,
Nancy Cruzan remains in a "persistent vegetative state" (PVS), unable to
care for herself.' 0 Her only reactions to her surroundings are grimaces in
response to painful stimuli and an apparent response to sounds. While she
is not terminally ill, there is no hope for improvement in her condition."
Nancy Cruzan's parents (co-guardians) requested termination of artificial
nutrition and hydration, but employees of the Mount Vernon State Hospital
refused to comply with the request without a court order.' 2 The family
sought a declaratory judgment sanctioning the removal of her feeding tube. 3
After a hearing, the trial court ordered the hospital to comply with the
4
request.
The trial court found that Nancy had made comments to a friend
"that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she
could live at least halfway normally."' 5 In the trial court's view, Nancy's
comments suggested that "given her present condition she would not wish
to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.' '1 6 The trial court held
that the fundamental "right of liberty" found in both the Missouri and

United States Constitutions permits an individual to refuse "artificial deathprolonging procedures when the person has no more cognitive brain function
than our Ward."11 7 To deny the co-guardians authority to exercise Nancy's
right to refuse nutrition and hydration would deny her the equal protection
of the law. 8 The appeal was taken directly to the Missouri Supreme Court. 9

9.

Id.

10. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411. A persistent vegetative state (PVS) is defined
as the irreversible loss of higher brain function. While the patient will have wake
and sleep cycles and possibly eye movements, the PVS is characterized by the lack

of conscious interaction with the environment. Since a significant number of such
patients regain independent function after short periods in a vegetative state,
physicians cannot diagnose PVS with certainty until a number of months have
passed. Johnson, Withholding Fluids and Nutrition: Identifying the Populations at
Risk, 3 IssuEs nr L. & MED. 189, 195-96 (1986).
11. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.

12. Id. at 410.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 433 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court).
16. Id.

17. Id. at 434 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court). The trial
court referenced Mo. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 2, 10 and U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
The trial court also held Missouri's Living Will statute, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 459.010.055 (1986), unconstitutional "to the extent that the statute or public policy prohibits
withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration or euthanasia or mercy killing"
when applied in every circumstance. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 434. The Cruzan court
reversed the trial court's finding of unconstitutionality. Id. at 420.
18. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 434. The trial court, while directing the hospital
to carry out the respondent's request, held that the decision to remove the tube

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
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II.

THm IssuEs

The Cruzan court began its analysis of the issues by evaluating the
right to refuse medical treatment, both from a common law and a constitutional right to privacy perspective. 20 In examining the state interests
involved, the court focused on the state's interest in the preservation of
life. 2' The Cruzan court held the state interest in life more weighty than
the patient's right to refuse nutrition and hydration-a decision that diverged
sharply from decisions in other jurisdictions." Finally, the court questioned
the validity of third party consent. 23 Again breaking with the majority of
courts, 24 the Cruzan court found no basis for a guardian to authorize
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. 2
The Right to Refuse Treatment
The common law right to refuse medical treatment derives from the

principle that treatment administered without consent is a battery.2 6 The
Cruzan court noted, "The doctrine of informed consent arose in recognition
of the value society places on a person's autonomy and as the primary
vehicle by which a person can protect the integrity of his body." 2 7 The
necessary corollary to informed consent is the right to refuse medical
'28
treatment: "If one can consent to treatment, one can also refuse it."
In Cruzan, the court cited three criteria for a valid, informed consent
to a medical treatment: the "patient must have the capacity to reason and
make judgments;" the "decision must be made voluntarily and without
coercion;" and the "patient must have a clear understanding of the risks
and benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives or non-treatment, along

was the guardian's and could be exercised in keeping with their ward's best interests.
Id.
19. Id., 760 S.W.2d at 410. The Cruzan court did not explain the basis of
its jurisdiction except to cite Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 3, which provides in part: "The
supreme court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction involving the validity of
a ... statute ... of this state . . . ." While the court did not expressly state its
jurisdictional grounds, jurisdiction might have been premised upon the trial court's
challenge of the constitutionality of the Living Will statute. See supra note 17.
20. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 416-18.
21. Id. at 419.
22. Id. at 424.
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
25. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424-26.
26. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
27. Id.
28. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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with a full understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosi8."29
In light of these requirements, the Cruzan court found it "definitionally
impossible for a person to make an informed decision-either to consent
or to refuse-under hypothetical conditions." 30 For the court, a decision
to refuse treatment-especially when that refusal means death-should be
as informed as any decision to accept treatment.3 ' The court then found
the evidence of Nancy Cruzan's consent
"woefully inadequate" and held
32
there had been no informed consent.
In other jurisdictions, courts have been willing to find consent by
incompetent patients upon lesser demonstrations of the patient's wishes.33
A number of New York courts have used the common law right to refuse
treatment as the basis for their decisions in cases involving the removal
of life-sustaining treatment for incurable incompetents.3 4 In contrast to most
jurisdictions (but similar to Cruzan) New York courts have been relatively
rigid in their requirements for establishing informed consent, holding that
"no one should be denied essential medical care unless the evidence clearly
and convincingly shows that the patient
intended to decline the treatment
' 35
under some particular circumstance.
The court, in In re Eichner,36 gave this common law right as the reason
for allowing the removal of a respirator from an elderly religious brother
who had suffered cardiac arrest and severe -brain damage during surgery.
The Eichner court held that life-sustaining treatment could be removed
only on the basis of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's expressed
wishes 7 The court found that Brother Fox had made "solemn pron-

29. Id. (quoting Wanser, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel,
Safer, Stone, Taussig, & Van Eys, The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopeleslsly
Ill Patients, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955, 957 (1984)).
30. Id.
31. Id.at 424.
32. Id. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
33. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert.
denied sub nom. In re Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). Set also infra notes 122-31
and accompanying text regarding substituted judgment.
34. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d
607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) (withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from incompetent patient requires clear and convincing proof of patient's specific wishes);
People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d. 341, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 472 N.E.2d 286 (1984) (follows
Storar and holds that third party may not make withdrawal decision for patient);
In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (respirator
removed from PVS patient in keeping with his prior explicit statements).
35. Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d at 531, 531 N.E.2d at
613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
36. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied sub
nom. In re Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
37. Id. at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
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ouncements and not casual remarks" about his convictions concerning the
use of a respirator on patients in a persistent vegetative state.38
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in In re Westchester County
Medical Center 9 authorized a hospital to insert a nasogastric feeding tube
into a mentally incompetent, elderly stroke victim despite objections from

her daughters. 40 The court based its refusal to withhold food on the lack
of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desires under those circumstances. 4 ' In a footnote, the Westchester court compared the situation
to conveyances of real property which must be made with specificity and
in writing; likewise, a will requires great formality. The court reasoned
thtt it is not "unrealistic" to build in the same formalities to protect a
person's life as the law accords a person's property. 42 Other jurisdictions
have based the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration upon the common
law right to refuse treatment, and have frequently combined that argument
with a constitutional right to privacy argument. The level of consent required
has ranged from a competent patient's full, informed consent 43 to third
party decisions made for incompetent patients with varying findings about
the patient's earlier expressed wishes. 44

38. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. Fox had conducted
"formal" discussions in his role as a Catholic teacher. In the context of discussing
the Karen Quinlan case, he had said he would want nothing extraordinary done
to keep him alive. Id. In Eichner's companion case, In re Storar, the New Jersey
court refused to permit the discontinuance of blood transfusions to a retarded
adult suffering from terminal cancer because the court felt it was impossible to
determine the wishes of a person incompetent from birth. Id. at 380-82, 420 N.E.2d
at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76.
39. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 532-34, 531 N.E.2d at 614-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-94. The patient
had once stated: "I would never want to be a burden on anyone and I would
never want to lose my dignity before I passed away." She had also said that it
is "monstrous" to keep someone alive with "machinery, things like that" when
they were "not going to get better." Id. at 526-27, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d
at 890.
42. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893 n.4.
43. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986) (removal of nasogastric tube from "intelligent, mentally competent" 28year-old quadriplegic with cerebral palsy). See also In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335,
529 A.2d 404 (1987).
44. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987)
(removal of nasogastric tube from PVS patient may be exercised by guardian, if
in patient's "best' hterests"); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc.,
209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989) (allowed removal of g-tube of PVS patient
at request of family); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., 398 Mass. 417,
497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (guardian permitted to exercise the PVS patient's right to
remove g-tule-"substituted judgment"). See infra notes 119-31 and accompanying
text for discussioi of "substituted judgment" and the "best interests" analysis.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The Patient's Constitutional Right to Privacy

The Cruzan court briefly considered the issue of a constitutional right

to refuse treatment. 45 The court found no express right to privacy in the
Missouri Constitution, nor did it find any unfettered interest that "would
support the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance."' ' Turning to the federal constitution, the Cruzan court noted
that the United States Supreme Court had not specifically enlarged the
right to privacy to allow a patient or guardian to order the withdrawal
of food and water. The court determined that no such right was embodied
in the penumbral right to privacy, 47 and emphasized that, in Bowers v.
Hardwick,41 the United States Supreme Court had refused to extend the
right to privacy beyond the bounds of marriage and procreation. To do
so would amount to the discovery of a new right.4 9 Concluding its privacy
analysisj the Cruzan court expressed "grave doubts" as to the existence
of any federal constitutional right of refusal by which food and water
might be denied an incompetent patient.50
Many state courts, beginning with the seminal case of In re Quinlan,"'
have based the right to refuse medical treatment upon either a state or
federal constitutional right to privacy. These decisions are primarily based
upon the recognition of the right to personal privacy found in Roe v.
52
Wade.
A federal court has also recognized a constitutional right to refuse
treatment in Gray v. Romeo,53 a case very similar to Cruzan. In Gray,
the court held that Marcia Gray, a patient in a PVS, had a constitutional
right to have her feeding tube removed. 4 Citing Roe, the Gray court
recognized that this right of privacy wa not absolute but must be balanced
against state interests. 56 Still, the courtfound no state interest sufficient
5
to override that right.

45.

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417-18.

46. Id. at 417.
47. Id. at 418.
48.

478 U.S. 186 (1986) (right to privacy does not extend to homosexual

conduct).
49. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418.
50.

51.
429 U.S.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.

70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
922 (1976) (authorized removal of respirator from PVS patient).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 588. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.

56. 697 F. Supp. at 588-90. See discussion of state interests infra notes 5774 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
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Competing State Interests

In the Cruzan case, the court recognized four state interests which
57
must be balanced against any right to refuse treatment or right to privacy:
the prevention of homicide and suicide; the protection of innocent third
parties,5 8 the protection of the medical profession's integrity; 9 and the
preservation of life. The court focused only on the preservation of life
interest. 60
The analysis of the life interest included two components. First, the
court assessed the state interest in the prolongation of life6' and held that
this interest is highest where illness is curable. 62 On the other hand, the
interest in prolonging life "wanes where the underlying affliction is incurable
and 'would soon cause death regardless of any medical treatment."' 63 Since
Nancy Cruzan is not terminally ill, the court that found the state interest
in prolonging life was valid. 64
The second component of the analysis is the "state's concern with the
sanctity of life [which] rests on the principle that life is precious and
worthy of preservation without regard to its quality." 65 The Cruzan court
referred to Missouri statutes which demonstrate the state's interest in the
sanctity of life, both at its beginning and at its end. The court cited
Missouri Revised Statutes section 188.0106 which announces the "intention
of the General Assembly of Missouri to grant the right to life to all humans,

born and unborn.

'67

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Cruzan court quoted Missouri's
Living Will statute, 6 to illustrate the state's interest in life near its end.
The statute allows a competent person to declare, in advance, that no
treatment which merely prolongs the dying process should be administered

57. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
58. E.g., where a patient has minor children who would lose their means
of support.
59. The American Medical Association adopted guidelines in 1986 which
would permit the discontinuance of nutrition or hydration under the facts of this
case. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 423 n.18. The Cruzan court did not discuss personal
objections to court-ordered withdrawal of nutrition and hydration by individual
professionals.
60. Id. at 419.
61. Id.
62. Id.(citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 188.010 (1986).
67. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
68. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (1986). The court emphasized that the
statute was not applicable to the instant case, but served only to show the state's
interest in the sanctity of life. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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if the declarant becomes incompetent, irreversibly ill, and will die within
a relatively short time.6 9 The provision of nutrition and hydration is not
within the definition of "death prolonging procedures," and may not be
withheld or withdrawn. 70 The recommended form of the declaration is, "It
is not my intent to authorize affirmative or deliberate acts or omissions
'
to shorten my life rather only to permit the natural process of dying."' 7
Having established the state's interest in life, the court in Cruzan
cautioned against measuring the patient's quality of life in assessing the
state interest in life. The preservation of life could never be equated with
quality of life. The court stated: "Were quality of life at issue persons
with all manner of handicaps might find the state seeking to terminate
' 72
their lives. Instead the state's interest is in life; that interest is unqualified.
In considering state interests, the Cruzan court, while adopting the
conceptual framework developed in other jurisdictions, reached an entirely
different result.73 Earlier court decisions more often found the state's interest
in preserving life less compelling, especially when measured against the
74
strong right to refuse treatment found in most jurisdictions.
Are Nutrition and Hydration Different?
A critical test in Cruzan was the balance between the right to refuse
nutrition and hydration against the state's interest in life. Key concerns in

balancing include the inherent differences between "nutrition and hydration" and other medical treatments. 5 In this area Cruzan differs strikingly
from other jurisdictions.
With medical treatment, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary medical treatment is one means of separating the permissible denial
of treatment from the impermissible.76 In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme
Court permitted the removal of a respirator from a patient in a PVS and
labeled the use of Karen Quinlan's respirator "extraordinary" treatment.
The ordinary/extraordinary terminology, however, is difficult to apply because it turns as much on the patient's condition as it does upon the
nature of the treatment in question.7 8 For example, the use of a respirator
was considered extraordinary treatment in Quinlin, but the use of a res-

69.

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419; Mo. Rlv.

STAT.

70. Mo. Rv.

STAT.

§ 459.010(3) (1986).

71.

Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 459.015.3 (1986).

72.
73.
74.
75.

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420.
Id. at 420-22.
See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420-24.

§§ 459.010-.015 (1986).

76. For a discussion of the problems in the extraordinary/ordinary approach,
see Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).

77. 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
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pirator to sustain a patient after surgery would likely be considered merely
ordinary. The difficulty in dealing with such a moving target led the
Quinlan court to abandon the distinction nine years later in In re Conroy.80
The Conroy court, while recognizing the "emotional symbolism" of food,
rejected any distinction between feeding tubes and other life-sustaining

medical treatments."' Other state courts have also failed to make such
distinctions,8 2 while some go further and actually define
long-term tube
3
feedings as "not only intrusive but extraordinary.'

'

Rejecting the question of whether a feeding tube was to be considered
medical treatment, the Cruzan court considered the issue irrelevant.8 4 The
court concluded that such distinctions merely provided the courts with
useful euphemisms which made palatable those decisions that might "seem
harsh when explained in plainer language.'"'85 Even though the Cruzan court

did not quibble over the
food and water, unlike
maintain a life.''86 The
useless unless it cures is

feeding versus treatment distinction, it found that
other treatments, "do not treat an illness, they
court said that to insist that such treatment is
to tread dangerous ground:

When we permit ourselves to think that care is useless if it preserves
the life of the embodied human being without restoring cognitive capacity,
we fall victim to the old delusion that we have failed if we cannot cure
and that there is, then, little point to continue careY
While most courts have found tube feedings indistinguishable from
other medical procedures, 88 some commentators view the denial of nutrition

79.
80.

See id.
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).

81.

Id. at

-,

486 A.2d at 1236.

82. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Corbet
v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Jobes, 108 N.J.

394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
83. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588-89 (D.R.I. 1988); Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 437, 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (1986).
84. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 423.
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Green, Setting Boundariesfor Artificial Feeding, 1984 THE
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

12, 13).

88. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Some courts, in viewing
nutrition and hydration by feeding tube as medical treatments, appear to demand
too much of mere food and water. These courts write as though they expect
nutrition and hydration to cure illness, and if it does not, then it is ineffective.
The real difficulty is that it is too effective in achieving its purpose, for the function
of food and water in such patients is no different than its function for any other
living organism: to sustain life. See Barber v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d at
1016-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489-91; Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 434 (Higgins, J., dissenting)
(quoting the trial court).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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and hydration as fundamentally different.8 9 One contrast noted is that by
withholding nutrition and hydration a patient is relegated to final and
certain death; final to a biological certainty that does not exist with the
denial of other medical or surgical procedures. 90 The experts expected Karen
Quinlan to die when her respirator was removed, but she did not. A patient
needing insulin, kidney dialysis or a blood transfusion may live without
treatment, despite medical opinions to the contrary.9 1 But no one survives
denial of food and water.
One of the expert witnesses in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital,

Inc.92 writes that it is a false distinction to differentiate between nutrition
and hydration dispensed through a feeding tube and food delivered on a
tray. 93 He notes:
[V]irtually every citizen of twentieth-century post industrial America
is in simple fact "fed" by the most advanced and technologically complex
system of food stuff production, transportation, preservation, refrigeration,
preparation, and distribution that the world has ever seen. The food
provided to Paul Brophy or other chronically ill patients is not transformed
into an exotic substance by the simple act of pouring it into a gastrostomy
tube.94
One rationale courts have used to blunt the differences has been to
hold that removal of a feeding tube does not cause the patient's death.

Whenever nutrition and hydration is discontinued patients die, not from
starvation or dehydration, but from whatever underlying illness has prevented their eating and drinking without assistance. 95 One commentator
finds this reasoning convenient but illusory:
Blaming the underlying disease rather than the act of life support removal
is romantic but illogical. A person who removed a feeding tube from a

recovering patient temporarily dependent on it would have a difficult time
persuading anyone that the resulting death was caused by the underlying
illness not by the removal of the tube.9

89. One writer amusingly suggests, "If nutrition actually is medical treatment,
justice would demand that the American Medical Association open its ranks to
many highly deserving chefs." Note, L V. Withdrawal: The Severance of Medicine's
or Society's Umbilical Cord, 63 NEB. L. REv. 941, 958 (1984).
90. Derr, Why Food and Fluids Can Never Be Denied, 1986 TiE HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT 28, 28.
91. Id.
92. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
93. Derr, Why Food and Fluids Can Never Be Denied, 1984 THE HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT 28, 30.
94. Id.
95. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D.R.I. 1988). See also
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, __, 741 P.2d 674, 685 (1987); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 437-39, 497
N.E.2d at 637-38.
96. Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 67, 83 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
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The not so subtle assertion that feeding tubes are only medical procedures and that removing them does not cause the patient's death serves
to bolster the Cruzan court's assertion that courts are merely trying to
"meet the end sought," namely, to cause the patient's death. 97 When death
is both the goal and the inevitable result, it does not help the analysis to
pretend that the patient is being allowed to die rather than admit that we
are causing the death.98
That death is the goal and not just the unintended result of removing
invasive medical procedures is illustrated by cases such as the California
Court of Appeal's Barber v. Superior Court.99 At the request of the family,
who "wanted all machines taken off that are sustaining life," doctors
removed a respirator from a patient in a vegetative state.00 Upon removal
of the respirator the patient did not die. The patient's I.V. feeding tube
was then removed; six days later the patient died of dehydration. 01
In nearly every instance, including the Cruzan case, the guardians are
not asserting that the feeding tube itself is unwanted, but rather the
seemingly purposeless life that it sustains is unwanted. Withholding nutrition
and hydration is a practice saturated with dangers, both to individuals and
to society. It should be confronted with frank admissions concerning our
objectives.' °2
At the time of the Cruzan decision not a single reported case existed
in which a court found state interests sufficient to counterbalance the PVS
patient's right to refuse nutrition and hydration. 03 In both Bouvia v.
Superior Court'04 and In re Farrell,05 the courts found that the state's

97.

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 413.

98. Defendants' Reply and Supplemental Brief at 10, Cruzan v. Harmon,
No. CV384-9P (Cir. Ct. Jasper County, Mo., P. Div. Carthage 1988).

99. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). Another such instance
was in In re Bayer, No. 4131. (Burleigh County, N.D. Feb. 5, 1987). The trial

court ordered the feeding tube removed from an incompetent patient with brain
damage. She survived when her physician determined that she could swallow if the

food was placed in her mouth with a syringe. At that point, the court ordered
feeding stopped altogether. D. O'STEEN, EUTHANASIA: MODEPN AMERICA's
DEZVOUS Wrru DEATH 5 (1988).
100. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
101. Note, supra note 89, at 952 (citing Prosecution's Brief).

102.

REN-

Judge Blackmar, in his dissent to Cruzan, does confront the issue of

taking a life. He writes: "The very existence of capital punishment demonstrates

a relativity of values by establishing the proposition that some lives are not worth
preserving." Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 428-29 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
103. In those decisions where removal of a feeding tube was not permitted,
the refusal was based upon uncertainty as to the patient's wishes. See In re

Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1988); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (patient incompetent
but able to answer simple questions and capable of limited bodily movements).
104. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
105. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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interest in preserving life was not sufficiently compelling to prevail over
a competent patient's desire to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Cruzan observed that the courts, since abandoning the nature of the
treatment as a basis for treatment decisions, have "focus[ed] on the patient's
medical prognosis and the individual patient's assessment of the quality of
life in the face of that prognosis."'0 If the prognosis gives little hope of
recovery, then the desire of that patient who finds the prognosis unacceptable
will prevail over the state's interest. 107 When one takes this analysis to its
logical end, prognosis becomes irrelevant. 0 8 The court quotes one commentator:
This situation is conducive to a rhetorical justification of the casesauthorizing the patient's choice is merely allowing an inexorable dying

process to continue. While this distinction is rhetorically convenient, it is
not easily justifiable by principle: where the patient's right to refuse medical
treatment is constant, the patient's condition and prognosis would no

longer seem to be relevant.1°9

When prognosis becomes irrelevant and when the patient's wish always
prevails over the state interests, the test "leads to the judicial approval of
suicide.""10 The Cruzan court stated that, while other courts had achieved
the desired result by minimizing the state interest and elevating the patient's
right to refuse,' "we may not arbitrarily discount either side of the equation
to reach a result which we find desirable." 112
The Cruzan court ultimately balanced Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse
nutrition and hydration against the state's interest in the preservation and
the sanctity of life. Deciding that the gastrostomy tube was not burdensome
to her, the court found Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse treatment outweighed
by the "immense, clear fact of life in which the state maintains a vital
4
interest.""' The Cruzan court then turned to the issues of guardianship."

106.
107.
108.

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 421.
Id.
Id.
109. Id. at 421-22 (quoting L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW, 1366
(2d ed. 1988)).
110. Id. The court in In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987), held:
"The privacy that we accord medical decisions does not vary with the patient's
condition or prognosis [which] is generally relevant only to determine whether the
patient is or is not competent, and if incompetent, how the patient, in view of
that condition, would choose to treat it were she or he competent." Id. at -,
529 A.2d at 423. Cf. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal.

Rptr. 297 (1986). "[I]f the right of the patient to self-determination as to his own
medical treatment is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount ....

[A]

desire to terminate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to
privacy." Id. at 1141, 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304, 306.
111. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 422.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 424.
114. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
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Guardianship and Third Party Consent

In Cruzan, the court assailed a concept which many other jurisdictions
have embraced: allowing a guardian or other person to decide whether to
withdraw nutrition and hydration from an incompetent person. 15 The court
attacked this policy on three grounds. First, it questioned the statutory
authority of a guardian to cause the death of a ward. 1 6 Second, the court
cast doubt on whether the right to refuse nutrition and hydration could
even survive the patient's becoming incompetent. 1' 7 Finally, the Cruzan
court viewed the notion of third party consent as imposing others' judgment,
on the incompetent patient, under the guise of fulfilling the patient's
wishes."
Courts have used various approaches in allowing third parties to make
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration decisions on behalf of incompetent
persons. One approach is to determine what action is in the "best interests"
of the patient." 9 The advantage of the best interest analysis is that it does
not require any evidence of the patient's desires, given a certain set of
circumstances. 120 Factors to consider in a best interest analysis are the
prognosis, the burdens upon the patient and the quality and duration of
2
the sustained life.' '
But not every court has found the best interests analysis appealing.
The court in Brophylu rejected it as inconsistent with personal autonomy
and as too "paternalistic."'2 The Brophy court instead adopted the "substituted judgment" rationale which aspires to carry out the will of the
patient as determined from the available evidence. 24 Substituted judgment
2 5 The Jobes court wrote that
was the preferred analysis in In re Jobes.'
the substituted judgment approach was the ideal. While unworkable where

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 425.
Id.at 425-26.
See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207,

-,

741 P.2d. 674, 688-89

(1987).
120. Id.
121. Id. at Ariz. 207, -, 741 P.2d. 674, 689 (1987). The court clarified in
footnote 23 that "quality of life" referred not to the value of the incompetent's
life as determined by others, but to its value as determined by the patient. This

would seemingly move the analysis into a substituted judgment situation to some
extent.
122. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
123. Id. at 431, 497 N.E.2d at 633. The Brophy dissent, on the other hand,
viewed the substituted judgment of the majority as "paternalism masquerading as

the mere ratification of autonomous choice." Id. at 448, 497 N.E.2d at 643 (Lynch,
J., dissenting).
124. Id.at 433, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
125. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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the patient has always been incompetent, the Jobes court held a substituted
judgment appropriate for a once-competent patient if made by a family
26
member or close friend familiar with the patient's "subjective viewpoint."1
Courts in other jurisdictions, since accepting the withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration, have attempted to set guidelines for withdrawal to avoid
judicial review. In Jobes, the court provided that agreement by a hospital
prognosis committee or two neurology experts, the attending physician, if
any, and the family and guardian would be sufficient for termination of
nutrition and hydration without recourse to judicial intervention. 27 In
McConnell v. Beverly-Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc.,'2 1 the Connecticut supreme court based removal of a gastrostomy tube from a PVS patient on
a state statute. 29 Under the court's construction of the statute, once a
substituted judgment has been made as to the "terminal" patient's wishes,
the attending physician need only obtain permission from the next of kin. 3 0
Similar guidelines are found in other decisions, which considered court
3
involvement appropriate only when the interested parties disagree.1 1
The Cruzan court's analysis of third party consent to remove a feeding
tube began with the Missouri statute that governs the guardianship of an
incompetent ward. 32 The court noted that the statute made no provision
for termination of treatment: "[T]o the contrary, it places an express,
affirmative duty on guardians to assure that the ward receives medical care
and provides the guardian with the power to give consent for that pur33
pose."P
In considering the common law right to refuse nutrition and hydration,
the Cruzan court held that the guardian's power is granted by the state,
not derived from the constitutional rights of the ward.3 4 The court viewed

126. Id. at -, 529 A.2d at 449.
127. 108 N.J. at -, 529 A.2d at 448. New Jersey also has Ombudsman
procedures for protection of the elderly. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375-76, 486 A.2d at
1241-42.
128. 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989).
129. Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a570 to 19a-575 (West Supp. 1988). Relevant portions of the statute are set out
infra note 160.

130. 209 Conn. at 708, 553 A.2d at 604. The McConnell court's interpretation

of the statute is discussed infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
131. See Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 198-200, 245

Cal. Rptr. 840, 850-52, cert. denied sub nom. Drabick v. Drabick, 109 U.S. 399
(1988); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
132. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
133. Id. The Cruzan trial court's decision to allow the withholding of nutrition

and hydration was based principally upon a "best interests" analysis, but the
Missouri Supreme Court never addressed the "best interest" argument directly. Id.
at 434 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting trial court). Since the Cruzan court recognized no constitutional right to refuse treatment, any "best interests" considerations would presumably be analyzed under the guardianship statutes.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
134. Id. at 425.
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the doctrine of substituted judgment not as an exercise of the parenspatriae
power, but rather as an abrogation of it.' The court cited one commentary
which warned:
[T]hird party consent allows the truly involuntary to be declared
voluntary, thus bypassing constitutional, ethical and moral questions, and
avoiding the violation of taboos. Third party consent is a miraculous
creation of the law-adroit, flexible, and useful in covering the unseemly

reality of conflict with the patina of cooperation." 6

In addressing the idea that the guardian's power is derivative of the

patient's own constitutional right, the Cruzan court noted the argument
made in Quinlan.'37 The Quinlan court concluded, "The only practical way
to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and the family
of Karen to render their best judgment

. . .

as to whether she would exercise

it in these circumstances."' 3 The Cruzan court found the Quinlan doctrine
of indestructible rights without precedent, reasoning that privacy rights are
rooted in personal autonomy, or "self law -the ability to decide an issue
without reference to or responsibility to any other."' 13 9 Thus, the Cruzan
court considered it "logically inconsistent to claim that rights which are
found lurking in the shadow of the Bill of Rights and which spring from
concerns for personal autonomy can be exercised by another absent the
most rigid of formalities."'140
III.

Tnm

OUTLOOK AFMn'R CRUZAN

The Cruzan court narrowly held that Nancy Cruzan's co-guardians had
no authority to direct the removal of her feeding tube. 4' This holding
does not apply to competent persons wishing to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 42 The court wrote that "[t]he burden of continuing the provision
of food and water, while emotionally substantial for Nancy's loved ones,
is not substantial for Nancy.' 1 43 In classifying Nancy Cruzan's burdens as

135. Id. at 426.
136. Id. (quoting Price & Burt, Sterilization, State Action, and the Concept
of Consent, 1975 LAw ANm PSYCHOLOGY REv. 57, 58).
137. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424-26.
138. 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nona. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
139. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 425.
140. Id. There are numerous rights which disappear once the patient is no
longer capable of personally exercising the right, for example, the right to vote,
marry, or execute a will. Defendants Post-Hearing Brief at 34, Cruzan v. Harmon,
No. CV384-9P (Cir. Ct. Jasper County, Mo., P. Div. Carthage 1988).
141. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
142. Id. at 424.
143. Id. at 426. Since the court rejects any quality of life arguments to support
the withholding of nutrition and hydration, withdrawal under a sufficiently burdensome, painful situation would be based upon the recognition that the state
interest in life, though undiminished, would then be outweighed by the burden on
Published
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
the patient.
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insubstantial, the court implied that it considered some burdens great enough
to overcome the state's interest in the preservation of life, but it gave no
indication at what point the balance would shift. 144 Nor were principles
given to govern that decision once the severity of the burden is established.
45
These omissions were intentional.
The court in Cruzan judged that any changes in this area should come
from the people through the legislature. As courts continue to "invent

guidelines on an ad hoc piecemeal basis, legislatures, which have the ability
to address the issue comprehensively, will feel no compulsion to act . . '"1416
Cruzan has expressly left the legislature unencumbered by the court's
decision.1 47
The 1987 Oklahoma legislature addressed one side of the problem in
its Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act. 48 This Act creates
a legal presumption that incompetent patients have directed their health
care providers to supply sufficient nutrition and hydration to keep them
alive. 49 The presumption prevails unless by clear and convincing evidence
the attending physician establishes that the patient, when competent, decided
to forego nutrition and hydration. 50 The decision must be made with the
specific illness or injury in mind and with enough information to constitute
informed consent.15' Two other factors also cause the presumption to
disappear; when the feedings are not medically possible or when they cause2
"severe, intractable and long-lasting pain to the incompetent patient."1
Finally, the presumption does not apply when the incompetent patient is
"chronically and irreversibly incompetent" and where death due to a
terminal illness or injury is imminent. 53
The Act also confines a "terminal illness" to an illness that will result
4
from the illness, itself, regardless of the treatment provided."
death
in
This exception for imminent death does not apply if withholding nutrition
and hydration "would result in death from dehydration or starvation rather
55
than from the underlying terminal illness or injury."'
Despite its comprehensive language, a similar statute in another state
may not accomplish a goal of tightly limiting the denial of nutrition and

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. OLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3080.1-.5 (1987).
149. Id. § 3080.3.
150. Id. § 3080.4(A)(1).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 3080.4(A)(2).
153. Id. § 3080.4(A)(3).
154. Id. § 3080.2(7). The Cruzan court would apparently allow withdrawal
of nutrition and hydration in this instance. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying
text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
155. Id. § 3080.4(B).
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hydration. Those states recognizing a common law right to refuse treatment
would be bound by such statutory language, but jurisdictions that also
include a constitutional right to privacy as a basis for decision may not
56
let the statute stand.'
In McConnell v. Beverly-Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 5 7 the Connecticut Supreme Court circumvented statutory language which seemed to forbid
the denial of nutrition and hydration. Carol McConnell, fifty-seven years
old, had suffered a severe head injury due to an automobile accident. 5 '
Like Nancy Cruzan, she was in a PVS, with "no prospect for improvement."' 15 9 The McConnell court construed the terms of the state Removal
of Life Support Systems Act' 60 consonant with the right to refuse nutrition
and hydration.16 ' Statutory language defined a terminal condition as the
"final stage of an incurable or irreversible medical condition which, in the
opinion of the attending physician will result in death." 1 62 Consistent with
the statute, the patient's doctor in McConnell deemed her to be in a PVS,
"a condition that [would] ultimately lead to her death."' 163 The McConnell

156. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
157. 208 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989).
158. Id. at 696, 553 A.2d at 598.
159. Id.
160. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to 19a-575 (West Supp. 1989).
Relevant sections are as follows:
Sec. 19a-570. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this section and sections
19a-571 to 19a-575, inclusive:
(1) "Life support system" means any mechanical or electronic device,

excluding the provision of nutrition and hydration, utilized ...

inorder

to replace, assist or supplement the function of any human vital organ
or combination of organs and which prolongs the dying process;
(2) "Beneficial medical treatment" includes the use of surgery, treatment, medication and the utilization of artificial technology to sustain life;
(3) "Terminal condition" means the final stage of an incurable or
irreversible medical condition which, in the opinion of the attending physician, will result in death.
Sec. 19a-571. [No criminal or civil liability for removal of life-support
of an incompetent patient], provided, (1) the decision ... is based on
the best medical judgment of the attending physician; (2) the attending
physician deems the patient to be in a terminal condition; (3) the attending
physician has obtained the [prior] informed consent of the next of kin,
if known, or legal guardian, if any ... ; and (4) the attending physician
has considered the patient's wishes as expressed by the patient directly,
through his next of kin or legal guardian, or in the form of a document
executed in accordance with section 19a-575, if ... presented to, or in
the possession of the attending physician at the time the decision to
terminate a life support system is made. If the attending physician does
not deem the patient to be in a terminal condition, beneficial medical
treatment and nutrition and hydration must be provided.
161. McConnell, 208 Conn. at 704, 553 A.2d at 602.
162. CorN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(3) (West Supp. 1989).
163. McConnell, 208 Conn. at 708, 553 A.2d at 604.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

court agreed with the terminal diagnosis, even though nothing in the court's
facts indicated that she would or would not live for many years.' 64 The
court also construed the statutory definition of "nutrition and hydration"
to include feeding with spoons and straws but not feedings by gastrostomy
tube.165
Although the McConnell court did not address the constitutionality of
the statute directly, the implication of this and other court decisions is
that statutory language as strong as Oklahoma's would not pass constitutional muster.66 The legislative prerogative, the absence of which has
been lamented by the courts, is no bar to denial of nutrition and hydration
when courts have found a constitutional basis for that denial. Yet, apart
from future intervention by the United States Supreme Court, the Missouri
General Assembly is unconstrained from developing the comprehensive
solution that the Cruzan court invited. 67
In all of the cases dealing with the right to refuse nutrition and hydration
the subjects of the decisions have been hopelessly ill individuals. Despite

164. Id. Contrary testimony that Mrs. McConnell was not terminally ill was
also given in the trial court. Id. at 707, 553 A.2d at 604. The McConnell court
did not elaborate on how a patient's condition could be terminal when the patient
is not dying and could survive for years. This view would be impossible under the
Oklahoma statute which defines "final stage of a terminal illness" as where death
will come within a reasonably short time, and further, prohibits removal where
death by dehydration or starvation would result. See supra notes 154-55 and

accompanying text. From the facts, both Carol McConnell and Nancy Cruzan are
in a PVS with no prospects for recovery nor expectations of dying soon. Nonetheless,

the McConnell court considered its decision distinguishable from Cruzan because
Nancy Cruzan is not terminally ill. McConnell, 208 Conn. at 703, 553 A.2d at
602 n.10.
165. McConnell, 208 Conn. at 705, 553 A.2d at 603. It is difficult to predict

how far the courts will go in limiting the definition of nutrition and hydration.

One expert in the Cruzan trial testified that even if Nancy was capable of eating
from a spoon, that fact should not bear upon the decision to withhold food.
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 421 n.16. See also supra note 99 where a trial court ordered
that feeding by mouth via syringe be terminated.
166. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, -,
741 P.2d. 674, 692
(1987); Corbet v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
Most recently, the right of a surrogate decisionmaker to terminate nutrition and
hydration was upheld in In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1989). Estelle Browning was found to be incompetent but not in a
permanent vegetative state, suffering from an incurable, but not necessarily terminal
condition. She was found to have a privacy right under FiA. CONST. art. I, § 23,
allowing her to forego sustenance provided artificially by a nasogastric tube. The
court held that a guardian is entitled to make this decision as a surrogate decisionmaker for the patient. The court distinguished the decision from Cruzan due
to Missouri's "absence of a state right of privacy." In re Browning, 543 So. 2d
at 267.
167. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426-27. See Comment, The Dilemma of the
Person in a Persistent Vegetative State: A Plea to the Legislature for Help, 54
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/8
Mo. L. Rv. 645 (1989) (in this volume).
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the great disagreement among the courts and commentators, the number
of individuals affected remains relatively small.1 68 Still, a more ominous
danger exists; not in any single judicial precedent, but by a combination
of the various concepts being explored.
Court decisions have laid the preliminary groundwork for assisted
suicide. 6 9 A California proposal known as the Humane and Dignified Death
Act 7 would have permitted lethal injections for patients likely to die within
six months, but failed to accumulate enough signatures to get on the ballot

in 1988. Backers will try again in 1990.171 In the Netherlands, a patient
undergoing severe physical or mental suffering may be given a lethal
72
injection upon his explicit, repeated and informed consent.
The question that voluntary euthanasia raises is whether it could remain
voluntary. Many courts have already mapped out the constitutional right
to privacy rationale and extended the right to refuse nutrition and hydration
to incompetent patients by allowing the "substituted judgment" of a third
party. 73 The rhetorical question posed in those cases would be the same
for voluntary euthanasia: Why should a patient lose the right to voluntary
euthanasia just because they are retarded or senile? 74 The answer to that
question is too grave, too solemn to linger over until the day it is asked
in earnest. The question is ripe now.
RANDALL M. ENGLAND

168.

A recent estimate of 10,000 is given as the number of permanently

comatose patients alive today. Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLAIR

Rlv. 67, 84 (1988).
169. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
170.
171.
172.
1989 THE
173.

L.

L.A. Times, April 11, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, May 18, 1988, at 23, col. 1.
Rigter, Euthanasiain the Netherlands:DistinguishingFactsfrom Fiction,
HAsTaNcs CENTER REPORT 31, 31.

See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.

174. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text for a discussion on
substituted judgment.
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